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MULTISTAGE PRICiNG UNDERUNCERTAIN DEMAND
BY CHEE-YEE CHONG AWl) DAVID C.CHENCI
The optimal pricing policy of a monopolistic firm facing randomdemand and maximizing itse '.pecteI profit over a period of several stages is considered. The demand function
is assumed to he timeinvarg(sn but unknown. A special case when the cost is certain and the demand is
a linear function of the price is investigated. This is formulated as a stochastic control problem. is
is found that when both the intercept
and slope of the demand function are unknown, the Optimal pricing policy
does not correspond to optimal
prices for each individual stage. Approximate methods are used to find theoptimal policies Simulation results are gtrcn.
I. INTRODUCTION
There have been a growing number of studies of thebehavior of the firm under
uncertainty. Most of the existing work is concerned withthe single-period analysis
of the impact of uncerlainty. e.g. Mills (1959), Hymans(1966), Smith (1969),
Horowitz (1969), Zabel (1970), Baron (1971) andLeland (1972). The dynamics
and the learning behavior of the firm facing uncertainty havelargely been ignored.
In the work of Clower (1959), Day (1966) and Hadarand Hillinger (1969),some
dynamic adjustment processes are introducedto characterize the adaptive
behavior of firms. Under certain conditions, theyare shown to give rise to
convergent time paths of output and price, whichare related to optimal price and
output decisions under certainty. However, theseprocesses are ad-hoc measures,
and the adjustment coefficients have not been derived fromoptimization pro-
cedures. Nevins (1966) conducts simulation studies ofdynamic price-setting arid
quantity-setting policies of a monopoly model. As in theother studies (except
for the certainty-equivalence assumption), no consideration hasbeen taken into
account to allow for learning about uncertainty.
Dreze (1972) suggests that "full optimization wouldcall for taking into
consideration the expected value of the information generatedby the decisions,
in addition to the expected value of the directconsequences of the decisions.
To be concrete, a monopolist may wish to depart from the price whichmaximizes
expected profit, simply to learn more about his demand function."This dual
aspect of decision-making was first investigated by Feldbaum (1960) under the
title of dual control. Interesting approximationsto the optimal solution of dual
control problems are suggested recently by MacRae (1974), Tse, Bar-Shalomand
Meier (1973) and Tse (1974).
Since learning plays a crucial part in dynamic economic behavior under
uncertainty, dual control is a powerful tool of analysis. Chow (1973) and Aoki
(1973) and (1974) are among the first to apply dual controlto economics. They
have been able to shed more light into the complexities of optimizing behavior
in dynamic and stochastic economic models.
An attempt has been made to study from the viewpoint of dual control the
effect of uncertainty upon the behavior of the firmover time. To highlight the
311role of learning inintertemporal dccisionmaking, westudy a special model of
monopolist which carries noinventory, sets the price and produces instantaneously
according to demand. Eventhough the monopolist tries to maximize his expected
profit LIVCI a finite horizon,this niodelisessentially static if no learning is akcn
into account. Theintertemporal optimal pricing policy simply consists of optimal
prices for the individual stages.This will no longer he the case when the monopolist
utilizes the extra datagenerated by his pricing strategy to learn niore about the
uncertain demand curve.
A simple model of the firmis introduced in Section 11. In Section 111, the
equations governing the solution arepresented. A special case which can
solved exactly is discussed inSection IV. Three methods to 1pprOXjfl)ate the
solution for the general case aregiven in Section V. Section VI contains SO1flt
simulation results using two differentmethods.
ii.fIlI MoIliL
We assume that during any period k amonopolist faces the following demand
curve.
(2.1) i1(k) =p(k) + fi + 0(k)
where
p(k)is the price charged by the monopolist in period 1<
q(k)is the quantity demanded
zfiare parameters characterizing the demand curve
<o,fl>o
(1(k)is the error tcrn (noise) in the demand equation.
The monopolis.t knows that the demand is linear with constant but unknown
parametersandfi.A Bayesian assumption is used, i.e., the monopolist has
available to him prior statistics of the parametersandfias well as of the noise
0(k) affecting his demand. For instance, these can he obtained from standard
econometric models using past data. We assumeis normal with meanand
covariance a.fiis normal with meanand variance i, and0(k)is normal with
zero mean and covariance 1. The random variables are all independent.
The monopolist produces a homogenous product in each period and his
objective is to maximize the expected profit over N period. Thus his utility
function is linear in risk. We also assume that once he selects a price p(k), he can
produce, and supply the quantity demanded according to equation (2.1).
The profit for each period is
I) I p(k)q(k) - cq(k)
where c is a known and constant marginal cost.
The expected profit over N periods is thus
(2.3) J p(k)q(k)cq(k)}
312and the monopolist has to choose optimal prices p(k), k= 1,.. ., N in order t
maximize his expected profit.
The model we study is one that is frequently used.Although assumed time-
invariant here, x and /3 can be relaxed to be time-varying, Thenormal distributions
are assunicd for convcnicnce but ate not overly restrictive. Most ofthe existing
work dealing with uncertain demand treats staticcases with the monopolist
optimizing his expected utility. Differences between priceSetting and quantity
setting were illustrated (e.g. Leland, etc.). In this paperwe try to reflect the fact
that most monopolists do not choose their price onlyonce but can in effect vary
it from time to time. If his objective is to maximize the expectedprofit over several
periods, then the pricing strategy which maximizes theexpected profit of each
period may not be the one to use. The intertemporal optimalstrategy has to take
into account the fact that learning is possible, and thus shouldbe adaptive in
nature. Some related results along this line have been obtained by Aoki(1973)
and (1974).
III. OPTIMAL PRICING STRATEGIES
In principle, the solution to our problem can be found usingdynamic pro-
gramming (Aoki, 1967). The following equation has to be solvedrecursively to
obtain the optimal p(k).
(3.1)J(1(k - 1), k) = max E[p(k)q(k)- cq(k) + 1(1(k), k + 1)jJ(k - 1)}
p(k)
with
(3.2) E{J(1(N - 1), N)fI(N1)} = E{p(N)q(N)- cq(N)jI(N - l)}.
I(k - 1) is the information available to the monopolistup to the beginning of
period k and consists of all the past prices and the quantities demanded, i.e.,
(3.3) 1(k - 1)= {p(0),. ..,p(k - 1), q(0),... , q(k - 1)).
The past stream of profits is also information available to the monopolist.
When the cost of production c is assumed to be known, this information is redun-
dant since profit is given by p(k)q(k)- cq(k). When c is not known exactly, then
the past profit will be useful in determining the optimal pricing policy.
It is well known that all the information in 1(k- 1) can be replaced by the




(3.4) 1(k)1 .(k)= [(k)j-E{[]
I(k)}
I




(kI)[P± 1)] + l'i] (k)
x e'(q(k +1) p(k + lj(k) -




This result isobtained by applyingthe standard Kalman filtering algorithm




f3(k + 1) /3(k)
(k)1
q(k) = [p(k)1][(k)j + 0(k).
EquatiOn (3.9) is a statementthat the parameters and/3 are constant. The details
of this can befound in (Athans, 1974).
Note that ingeneral the estimation error2(k) ofthe parameters will depend
on the pastpolicies p(k). However,whenis known, then the estimation error of
/3no longerdepends on the decisionsof the monopolist. As we shall see in the
next section, thepricing strategy then becomes verysimple.
1V. A SPECIAL CASE:is KNOWN
Whenis known, only theintercept of the demand curve is uncertain.
Under such circumstancesthe error covariance of the parameter $becomes
(4.1) L(k + 1) = ((k) + 0-')'
This is independent ofp(k).
Atk = N
(4.2) J((N - 1), N) = max E{p(N)q(N) -cq(Nfl(N -- l)}.
p(N
Maximization of this gives
(4.3) p*(N) = --((N - 1) -c)





At k = N -
(45) J(fl(N- 2), N - I)IflaX E{p(N - I )q(NI) - cq(n-I) p(N -
± J(fl(NI), N)/(N-- 2)}.
But
(4.6) E{J($(N - I), N)IR(N-- 2)) = -((N2) + c)2
4
+ - I) -(N2)] 4
is independent of p(N - 1). For details of this result,see Appendix Thus
(47) p*(N-- 1) =_±(fl(fr- 2) - ac).
2
In general
(4.8) p*(k)= (fl(kI) -- ac).
2
This is the optimal pricing policy for the single period k ifall the past prices and
quantities are used to generate a better estimate of theparameter fl Except for
the use of estimates instead of actual parameters, thispolicy is the same as in the
static and deterministic case. Thus, although themonopolist is optimizing over
N periods, the statistical assumption is such that all he hasto consider is the
immediate future. The optimal pricing policy for eachperiod has the same form
and is independent of the total number of periods. Wemay expect, however, that
his estimate should improve with more measurements, and thismay affect the
actual prices used.
V. GENERAL CASE: BomANDfiUNCERTAIN
The relevant equation to be solved is given by (3.1).At k = N, the solution
of this equation gives
(5.1) p(N) = - 1)(N - i)c)
where (N - 1) and fl(N- 1) are as given in Section III. The pricing policy is
similar to the static and deterministiccase except for the use of estimates. This is
expected since at that stage, the monopolist essentially facesa static problem.
The expected profit is given by
(5.2) J(I(N - 1), N) =
4.(N
1)(ft(N-I) + (N - 1)c)2.
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SAt kN - 1, we have tosolve
(5.3)J(!(N - 2), N - I) = maxE{p(N - 1 )q(N - 1) - cq(N I)
1)
- 4(N - 1
- 1) +(iVI )c)2I(P- 2)}.
From Section 111, we can seethat the last term in this maximization depends
on p(N - 1)and q(N -- i. Moreover, thedependence is nonlinear andnot
quadratic. An analytic solutionis thus not possible. Various approximations have
been suggested.
Open-Loop Feedback Optimal
At any time k, an open-loopproblem is solved which assumes that no addi-
tional information will be availablein the future. Thus the problem is to choose
a deterministic sequenceof prices
(5.4) p(k), p(k + 1).....p(N)}
to maximize the expectedfuture profit
(5.5) E{> p(i)q(i)-- cq(i)Il(kl)}.
Only p(k) is used. Once q(k) is observed, theestimates onandfiare updated and
the problem is solved again. For the problem under consideration the solution is
extremely simple. The optimal price is given by a certainty equivalence policy
which is the same as that for a static one-period case.
(5.6) p(k)= 2(k
(fl(k- I) -c(k - 1)c).
This price policy does not take an active role in reducing the uncertainty.
Since our model is uncoupled temporally except for the flow of information, the
optimal pricing policy thus reduces to that of a one-period problem.
Wide-Sense Adaptive Dual Control
In this approach (Tse, Bar-Shalom, Meier,- 1973). emphasis is placed on
finding an approximate representation for the function J(I(k), k + I) in equation
(3.1) given an arbitrary price p(k) The expression in (Il) is then solved numerically
to obtain p(k). Specifically, we use the following method to approximate the
expected profit.
Assume a price p(k) has been chosen at time k.
(k), the error covariance of the parameters can then be found using
equation (3.7). The predicted values of the parameters remain(k - I)
and (k - I) because of the special nature of our problem.
A nominal pricing policy {p0(k + 1), p0(k + 2).....p0(N)} is then chosen
which depends only on the predicted values of(k -- I) and 1(k - I).
316One possible candidate is the certainty equivalencetype strategy described
in Section V(a). Thus
(5.7)Po(/)2(k1)((k - I) - -- l)c)Ik 4 1.....N
(5.8)q0(j) = (k - l)p0(j) + (k - 1)jk + I.....N.
The nominal profit function is
Nk
(5.9) J0(k + 1) =
42(k1)((k - 1) + (k- l)C)2.
4. A perturbation analysis is done about the nominal ofequation (5.8) to
obtain the model
(5.10) q(j) = 2(k - l)p(j) + &p0(j) + öfl+ 0(j).
The incremental expected profit about this nominal is
(5.11)J(k + 1) = J(I(k),k + I)- J0(k + 1)
= ôp(j)q0(j) + p0(j)q(j)- eq(j)
j=Ic+ 1
+oP(J)&i(i)I(k)}.
Equations (5.10) and (5.11) define an optimization problem similarto the
special case discussed in Section IV. In fact the optimal incremental price
is given by
(5.12)= 2(k l) i)p(i) +j - 1)]
j=k-t-1,...,N
where the incremental parameter estimates are given by equations similar
to those in Section III. The error covariances of the incremental estimates
are, however, independent of the incremental price.
Let
is a constant matrix since p0(j) given by equation (5.7) is constant forj > k
(5.16) 1(k) = L '(k - 1)[Pk]0_'[p(k), 1].
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(5.13) L0(j) 4 coy { [] 1(1 -l)}.
Then
(5.14) (J)='(J.. l)+ K0(j)j=k+ 1.....N
where
(5.15) K0(k)[Po(J)]®_ '{p0(j), 1]The optimal expected incremental profit from period k + I to v i
(5.17)iJ(k + 1)= 4(kl)°
+
+ (N - k)[p0(k)öfl(k) + Ô(k)p(k)
- c2(k)p0(k) - c oJI(k)]
+ 4(:(A j - l)((j + o(j))K0(k).
The quantity on the right hand side of equation (3.I)to be maximizedcan
then be approximated by
(5.18)E{p(k)q(k) - cq(k) + J0(k + I) + 5J(k + 1)II(kl)}.
Since J0(k + 1) is independent of p(k), the quantity to be maximizedis then
(5.19) Jp(k)) = Ep(k)q(k) - cq(k)Jl(k - l)}
+ tr[0(N - 1) +0(N - 2)+
+0(k)]K0(k)k = I.....N- I
(5.20) Jd(p(k))= E{p(k)q(k) - cq(k)Il(k - l)},k = N.
5. After p*(k) is found, a new estimate of the parameters(k), fl(k) and their
covariances(k) are then updated. The wholeprocess is then repeated to
find p(k + 1).
In equation (5.19) except for k= N the quantity to be maximized consists of
two parts. The term inside the conditional expectationis the expected profit
influenced by the price for that stage. The secondpart consistsofthe error co-
variancesofthe parameter estimates about the nominal.They depend on p(k)
since0(k) depends on p(k). Since &(k- 1) is negative, the maximizationofthis
second part is equivalent to the minimization ofthe future error covariances of
the estimates. The optimal pt(k) is neitherthe price which maximizes the profit
for period k nor theone which minimizes the error covariances of the future.
The dual nature of p*(k) is thusvery clearly displayed. At the last stage, however,
p*(k) will simply be themaximization of profit.
(c) Approximate solution ofequation (3.1)
The method presented in SectionV(b) is one which has to be done in real
time. At each period k, the effectof the price p(k) on the expected total profitfrom
that period to the final periodis investigated by doinga perturbation analysis.
This includes computationofall the incremental covariances 10(k),...*0(N - 1), and doing an optimizationof a nonlinear and nonquadraticfunction. In the
problem under consideration thisis a realistic way since there is usually sufficient
time between the timeswhen the price is changed.Moreover, the quantity to be
318optimized is simple enough so that an optimization can be done easily using
numerical techniques. Other methods are also available which approximate the
solution to equation (3.1) (e.g. Chow, 1974). The optimal price p*(k) at each stage
is then a precomputahiefunction of the parameter estimates. Thisapproach is
more suitablefor situations when p(k) has to be changed rapidly so that insufficient
time is available for carrying out the optimization problem.
Specializing to our problem, the following steps are necessary.
I. A nominal price sequence is chosen to be {p(l).....p0(N)}.




Starting at the final period N, equation (5.2) is approximated by a Taylor
series expansion about the nominal, retaining only the linear and quadratic
terms of p(N - 1),(N - 2) and fl(N - 2).
Equation (5.3) can then be solved and will have a form dependent only on
- 2) and rnN - 2).
This process is repeated until k = 1. A sequence of p(k) in terms of the
estimates will have been obtained.
p(k) can then be used to generate a new nominal and the steps I to S are
then repeated. This can be done as often as possible.
The main feature of this approach is that the resulting pricing policies are
simple in structure. They will be of the form given by equation (5.1). However,
the optimality of the method depends on how far away the actual values are from
the nominal last used.
VI. S!1ULATION RESULTS
To illustrate the ideas of this paper, a numerical example is used. The demand
function is assumed to be
(6.1) q(k) = 2p(k) + 24 + 0(k).
Thus
(6.2) = 2p = 24.
The constant cost of production is 2. The number of periods Nis assumed to be
10 and 5.




0(k) has a covariance of I which is assumed known to themonopolist.
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lithe monopolist knows the exact values of and J?, his optimal price for each
period will be
(6.4) p(k) = 7k = I.....N.
His profit over ten and five periods will then have means of 500 and 250 and
standard deviations of 50 and 25 respectively.
The certainty equivalence (CE) policy in Section V(a) is compared with the
wide sense adaptive dual control (WSADC) policy in Section V(b). The method
in Section V(c) will be compared elsewhere. A linear search with quadratic inter-
polation is used to maximize Jd(p(k)) in equation (5.19). Ten simulation runs are
obtained for each policy.
The results for N = 10,= -2.5,1.? =20.ii=1,cr= 4 are tabulated
below in Tables I to 3.
TABLE I
COMPARISON BbTwEFN CE PRICING POLICYi WSADC Poi.tcv
Average Profit Range of Profit Range of p(k) P( I)
TABLE 2
RFSUIT OF CE Poi.trv FOR ONFSAMPlERUN
TABLE 3
RESULT OF WSADC POIJCY FOR ONE SAMPLE RUN
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k p(k) q(k) &(k) ft(k) Cumulative Profit
I 5.000 14.157 -1.390 20.888 42.472
2 8.511 5.935 -1.842 22.213 81.116
3 7.030 9.008 - 1.852 22J98 126.421
4 6.993 10539 - 1.816 22.268 179.040
5 7.131 10.591 - 1.780 22.273 233.384
67.256 10.3 14 - 1753 22242 287.599
7 7.346 9.027 - 1.762 22.260 335.854
87.316 8.851 - 1.774 22.280 382.906
9 7.279 10.373 - 1.755 22.258 437.663
10 7.341 8.575 - 1.771 22.289 483.461
k p(k) q(k) rnk) Cumulative Protit
I 6.307 11.643 - 1.470 20.653 49.717
2 8.031 6.896 -1.703 21.268 91.304
3 7.410 8.247 - 1.723 21.276 135.920
4 7.384 9.756 - 1.580 21.269 188.449
5 7.444) 9.973 - 1.643 21.238 242.704
6 7.486 9.862- I.67 21.203 296.765
7 7.556 8.606 - 1.628 21.225 344.581
8 7.521 8.442 -- 1.640 21.246 391.185
9 1.493 9.945 - 1.622 21.224 445.811
10 7.543 8.170 -1.637 21.257 491.099
CE 476.02 457.12-496.18 5.000-10.750 5.00
WSADC 484.85 46256-501.96 6.307- 9.605 6.30Our results show thatthe WSADC policy always gives a higher profit than the
CE pricing policy. Onthe other hand, the parameter estimates using CE pricing
are better thanthose of WSADC pricing. The most dramatic difference between
these two policies isin period 1. From Table 1, p( 1) is 5.000 for CE and is 6.307 for
WSADC policy. This is so because in the former case no use is made of the fact
that information willbe available in the future. Because of the nature of our
problem, only the profit forthat period is involved in the Optiflhization. Thus
p(l) is selected on the basisof a priori means ci andfito maximize the profit for
period 1. The result is a very poor performance for period 1 which contributes
to the totalprofit. On the other hand, the WSADC approach takes into considera-
tion the fact that more measurementswill be available in future. The future and
the present are no longeruncoupled. This results in a p(l) which is more optimal
for the overall problem. p(l)gives a bigger profit for period 1 and also improves
the estimates 2(l) and(l) leading to a better p(2). The reason that the future
estimates(k) and(k) are not as good as those given by certainty equivalence is
probably an accident.
Other priori statistical data have also been used. Ifis modified to 16, the
following results are obtained.
TABLE 4
N 10.a = 2.5.fi= 20.o = 1.o = 16
COMPARISON BErWEEN CE PRICING POLICY AND WSADC POLIcY
Average Profit Range of Profit Range of p1k) P(I)
CE 482.76 462.97-499.09 5.00-8.81 500
WSADC 485.03 463.43-501.21 5.31 -8.92 5.31
The CE policy performs almost as well as theWSADC policy and the prices
chosen at each period are almost identical.The parameter estimates are more
accurate than those obtained previously.
We also investigate how the time horizonaffects the pricing policies. If the
time horizon is cut by half, i.e., N = 5 theprices used are almost the same as the
first five used with a longer time horizon.With certainty equivalence policies
this has been expected since the prices areindependent of the time horizon. The
similar results for the WSADC policy indicatethat in this case the learning effect
is not very strong. This may have to dowith the assumption on the demand curve.
Since the demand is assumed to be linearwith constant slopes and intercepts,
knowledge of two sets of prices and quantitieswill be sufficient to determine the
demand function. It is probable that when thedemand function is more com-
plicated, e.g., with time varying parameters,the effect of learning will be more
significant.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have discussed thebehavior of a firm underuncertainty.
A simple classical model of monopoly is chosenfor study. The monopolistfacing
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unknown demand is assumed to have linear risk,constant marginal cost, finite
planning horizon and instantaneous product ioncapabilities. Without learning,
this model is static in thesense that optimal pricing for each individtlstage is also optimal for the whole planning horizon.However, active learningchanges this picture. Except for the specialcase when the slope of the demandcurve is
known, the multiperiod nature of theproblem has important effectson the pricing
policy of the monopolist. The additionaldata collected by themonopolist can always be used to update his informationon the demand curve. However,his policy also depends on the availability of futureinformation. If heassumes that the future data are not available, theoptimal pricing policy is essentiallythe same
as the optimal one for each period. When future dataare assumed to be available
this information will be used in his policydecision. Dual controlmethods arc applied to find approximate optimalsolutions. The simulationexperiments indi- cate that by including uncertainty,we improve the performance of themonopolist though in some cases the improvementis quite insignificant. It is,however, diffi- cult to distinguish between the effectsdue to the inclusion ofUncertainty and those due to the learningaspects of the algorithm.
In this paper, we haveconcentrated on the effect ofuncertainty on multi- period problems whichare essentially static in natureexcept for the propagation
of information. Natural extensionsof this present research will bethe investiga- tion of non-linear risk, the effectof risk aversion upon dualcontrol strategy, the
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APPENDIX
E{J(/J(N - 1),N)fl(N - 2) =E{_(fl(N- 1) + ccc)2)fl(N -2)}
- - 1) + c)2I(N -- 1)}lft(N-
-I' -4cr
- --E{(fJ + czc)2 - E(N - 1)I(N- 2)}. 4cr
But(N - I) is independent of fl(N - 2) by equation (4,1). Thus
E{J(P(N - 1),Nfl(N - 2)} = E{(fl + crc)2I(N2)} + - 1)
=_±.(fl(N- 2) + crc)2 - -- 2)
4cr 4
which gives equation (4.6).
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